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Does Achilles Forgive in the Iliad?
The Archaic Origins of the Virtue of 
Forgivingness*
Lucy M. Smith
In Before Forgiveness, David Konstan argues that the modern concept of interpersonal 
forgiveness was absent from Western thought until the early modern period. However, 
by “the modern” concept of the term, Konstan means one specific modern concep-
tion of forgiveness: that articulated by Griswold in Forgiveness, a conception unique 
amongst modern scholarship in its narrow, revisionary and prescriptive nature. In 
this paper I consider Konstan’s argument with respect to archaic Greece. I argue that, 
even when we limit ourselves to Griswold’s conception of interpersonal forgiveness, 
and to the two Iliadic examples considered by Konstan, there is more room for inter-
personal forgiveness in the Iliad than Konstan would have us believe. I will show that 
examination of Achilles’ renunciation of his resentment at Agamemnon in Iliad 18 
and Priam in Iliad 24 reveals the earliest depiction in Western literature of the virtue 
of forgivingness.
In Forgiveness: A Philosophical Investigation, Charles Griswold claims that the clas-
sical Greek philosophers did not uphold interpersonal forgiveness as a moral ideal 
(2007a:2–19). David Konstan defends Griswold’s claim, contending that not only 
did the classical Greek philosophers not value interpersonal forgiveness, but that 
the very concept of interpersonal forgiveness was absent from archaic Greece, the 
Hebrew Bible and early Judeo-Christianity (2010).1 Indeed, Konstan goes even 
* I am indebted to Associate Professor Luke Russell, Professor Rick Benitez, Professor Han Baltussen and 
Dr George Couvalis for their generosity in reading various drafts of this paper and for offering their
invaluable feedback on it. I am also grateful to Anna Campbell, Sarah Drews Lucas, Elena Walsh and
Tama Coutts for spending many fruitful hours discussing forgiveness with me.
1 A distinction must be drawn between claims regarding the evaluation of ethical concepts in specific 
contexts, and claims regarding the possession of those ethical concepts in the first place. Griswold offers 
a version of the former claim with respect to the classical Greek philosophers, claiming that “[Plato] 
had the concept of forgiveness, or at least the resources needed for the concept, but did not count 
forgiveness as a commendable quality” (2007b:269). Konstan, by contrast, offers a version of the latter 
claim with respect to ancient Greece and Rome, that is, that “the modern concept of forgiveness, in 
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further, arguing that “the modern concept of forgiveness, in the full and rich sense 
of the term”, is not present until Kant paves the way for it with his insistence of human 
moral autonomy; and systematic treatments of it do not begin to appear until the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (2010:152). However, by “the modern”, “full” 
and “rich” sense of the term, Konstan means one specific modern conception of 
forgiveness: that articulated by Griswold in the aforementioned work. Far from being 
“the” modern conception of forgiveness, Griswold’s is one of many, and Konstan 
does little to defend his subscription to it. Moreover, Griswold’s is a conception of 
forgiveness almost unparalleled in the modern scholarship in its narrow, revision-
ary, and prescriptive nature, and is thus unrepresentative of modern conceptions of 
forgiveness.2 It is therefore hardly surprising that, after defining modern forgiveness 
in such restrictive terms, Konstan concludes that it was absent in any time before 
the early modern period.3
In this paper, I consider Konstan’s argument that archaic Greece, as depicted in 
Homer’s Iliad, lacked the modern concept of interpersonal forgiveness.4 There is, of 
course, no reason to assume that archaic Greece necessarily shared our ethical con-
cepts. Nor is there any reason to think that any historical conceptions of interpersonal 
forgiveness must conform to our own. However, the claim that archaic Greece lacked 
the concept of interpersonal forgiveness is certainly surprising, and one that deserves 
much deliberation. It may prove to be the case that archaic Greece lacked the concept 
of interpersonal forgiveness, but my argument in this paper is that Konstan does 
not give us good reason to accept this. Certainly, Konstan succeeds in proving that 
archaic Greece lacked Griswold’s conception of paradigmatic interpersonal forgive-
ness. However, as we will see, Griswold’s conception of forgiveness is so narrow and 
the full or rich sense of the term, did not exist in classical antiquity, that is, in ancient Greece or Rome, 
or at all events that it played no role whatever in the ethical thinking of those societies” (2010:ix). 
As the focus of this paper is on Konstan’s claim, I will be looking not at whether Homeric man did 
value interpersonal forgiveness, or whether it is possible for interpersonal forgiveness to have been 
valued within the Iliad’s warrior ethos, but at whether the concept of interpersonal forgiveness existed 
in Homer’s thought-world.
For a partial rejection of this claim with respect to Aristotle, see Sadler, 2009; and for a rejection 
of this claim with respect to Judeo-Christianity, see Bash, 2007. Martha Nussbaum, while accepting 
Griswold’s account of forgiveness, agrees with Bash on this point (2016:272, n. 2).
2 For less prescriptive contemporary accounts of forgiveness see, for example: Allais, 2013; Pettigrove, 
2012; Russell, 2016; and Garrard & McNaughton, 2003. These scholars reject Griswold’s contention that 
morally admirable forgiveness requires the fulfillment of such conditions as apology, compensation, 
and moral reform.
For criticisms of Griswold’s account of forgiveness see, for example: Allais, 2013; Huget, 2012; 
Morton, 2010; Moody-Adams, 2010 and 2015; Prusak, 2009; and Wettstein, 2010. See also Griswold’s 
reply to a number of these critics (2010).
3 Douglas Cairns (2011) and Leo Zaibert (2012) express criticisms similar to mine in their respective 
reviews of Konstan’s monograph.
4 Page duBois takes up and defends Konstan’s claim with respect to archaic and ancient Greece in “Achil-
les, Psammenitus, and Antigone: Forgiveness in Homer and Beyond” (2012). However, as her focus is 
on the historicity of the emotion of empathy, her paper will not be considered here.
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demanding, that Konstan’s conclusion in an inquiry into the origins of forgiveness 
regarding its absence is of limited utility. While I do not subscribe to Griswold’s con-
ception of forgiveness, I will not be arguing against it in this paper. Rather, I will be 
arguing that even when we subscribe to Griswold’s conception, and even when we 
limit ourselves to the Iliadic examples discussed by Konstan — Achilles’ renunciation 
of his anger towards Agamemnon in Book 18, and towards Priam in Book 24 — we 
can see that there is more room for forgiveness in Homer’s epics than Konstan would 
have us believe. After offering an exposition of Griswold’s account of the virtue of 
forgiveness, and enumerating the conditions that attach to it, I will proceed to examine 
the two Iliadic examples considered by Konstan. I will conclude that what we see in 
the Iliadic examples is the origin of the virtue of forgivingness.
Let us first consider Griswold’s conception of interpersonal forgiveness. Griswold 
conceives of forgiveness as a virtue — forgivingness — consisting in an Aristotelian 
mean between the deficiency of hard-heartedness and the excess of servility with 
respect to anger or resentment (2007a:18).5 Hard-heartedness, he contends, is associ-
ated with other vices such as pride and arrogance, while servility bespeaks the lack 
of proper self-respect and the failure to take wrongdoing seriously. Forgivingness, by 
contrast, is associated with the virtues of self-command, understanding, and trust 
(2007a:43); requires good judgement; and results from proper habituation over time 
(2007a:18). The paradigmatic or ideal expression of the virtue of forgivingness is sub-
ject to a number of conditions that bind the victim and the wrong-doer respectively. 
For forgiveness in the full sense to occur, Griswold argues that the victim must do the 
following: foreswear revenge; moderate her resentment; commit to completely relin-
quishing this resentment; reframe the wrongdoer by ceasing to identify her with the 
wrongdoing; reframe herself by ceasing to identify with the person wronged, which 
requires compassion, sympathy and the recognition of shared humanity; and finally, 
communicate this forgiveness to the offender (2007a:54–58).
The offender must in turn fulfill the following conditions: acknowledge responsi-
bility for the wrongdoing; repudiate it; express regret for it; commit to being some-
one who does not commit such deeds; manifest understanding of the gravity of the 
wrongdoing; and, in communicating this regret to the victim, offer a narrative account 
of the wrongdoing explaining why she is not to be identified with her action (2007a: 
49–51).6 The fulfillment of all of these conditions constitutes perfect or paradigmatic 
forgiveness, in the sense that, explains Griswold, “were it possible for all of the con-
ditions pertaining to the paradigm to be fulfilled, we would wish for them to be so” 
(2007a:xvi).7 At the core of this paradigmatic forgiveness is a transformation on the 
5 For a sustained argument for, and treatment of, this virtue, see Roberts, 1995.
6 For a rejection of Griswold’s conception of forgiveness with respect to its dyadic nature, see Moody-
Adams, 2010 and 2015; and for a rejection of Griswold’s conditional conception of forgiveness, see 
Prusak, 2009.
7 For a criticism of Griswold’s distinction between paradigmatic and marginal instances of forgiveness, 
see Morton, 2010 and Wettstein, 2010.
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part of both offender and victim. The offender’s transformation consists in a change 
of heart with respect to wrongdoing in question, as a result of which the offender is 
no longer the kind of person to commit such a wrongdoing (2007a:56). The victim’s 
transformation, realised through a sympathetic identification with the offender, con-
sists in “seeing the offender in a new light”, which is to say, reframing her in such a way 
that she is no longer completely identified with her wrongdoing (2007a:57). It is only 
when each of these conditions has been fulfilled that we can say that perfect forgive-
ness has occurred. We are now in a position to see just how narrow and revisionary 
Griswold’s conception of interpersonal forgiveness is. For example, it precludes from 
qualifying as forgiveness such things as: unconditional forgiveness; forgiveness of the 
unrepentant; forgiveness of the dead; forgiveness despite the victim being unable to 
completely overcome her resentment towards the offender; and third-party forgive-
ness. It is thus unrepresentative of many contemporary popular and scholarly beliefs 
concerning forgiveness.
Having surveyed Griswold’s conception of forgiveness, let us now turn to the 
Iliadic examples, starting with that of Achilles and Agamemnon. The Iliad opens 
with the wrath of Achilles: Agamemnon has stolen Achilles’ war prize Briseis and, 
as a result, Achilles nurses his wrath at Agamemnon throughout the majority of 
the Iliad, refusing to return to the battlefield to fight for the Achaeans. As a result, 
hoards of Achaeans are slaughtered and the tide of battle turns in the Trojans’ favour. 
However, Achilles does eventually renounce his resentment in Iliad 18, and returns 
to the battlefield. Does this renunciation qualify as forgiveness? Konstan thinks 
not. One interpretation, which Konstan rejects, is that Achilles’ renunciation fails 
to qualify as forgiveness because, while Agamemnon has offered Achilles ample 
compensation, it is not entirely clear whether he has sufficiently acknowledged 
his wrongdoing and apologised for it (2010:61). Consider Agamemnon’s speech to 
Achilles in Iliad 19:
This is the word the Achaians have spoken often against me / and found fault with me 
in it, yet I am not responsible / but Zeus is, and Destiny, and Erinys the mist-walking / 
who in assembly caught my heart in the savage delusion / on that day when I myself 
stripped from him the prize of Achilleus. / But what could I do? It is the god who 
accomplishes all things. / Delusion is the elder daughter of Zeus, the accursed / who 
deludes all.
...
So I in my time, when tall Hektor of the shining helm / was forever destroying the 
Argives against the sterns of their vessels, / could not forget Delusion, the way I was 
first deluded. / But since I was deluded and Zeus took my wits away from me, / I am 
willing to make all things good and give back gifts in abundance. (Il. 19.85–138)8
Whether or not one thinks that Agamemnon’s words constitute an apology — the 
first of Griswold’s conditions for the offender — will depend, among other things, 
8 All translations of Homer’s Iliad are taken from Lattimore, 1951. All ancient Greek texts are taken from 
the respective Loeb editions.
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on whether one thinks that Homeric man can both blame an action on blinding, 
god-sent delusion — atē — while at the same time acknowledging responsibility 
for it.9 Without doubt, Achilles does not think that atē absolves Agamemnon from 
responsibility, and nor does Agamemnon think that it releases him from the obliga-
tion to compensate Achilles. Looking at Agamemnon’s speech from the perspective 
of another of Griswold’s conditions for the offender — a point left unexplored by 
Konstan — by drawing attention to the role of atē in his wrongdoing, Agamemnon 
could be seen to be offering something of a narrative account of the wrongdoing 
and an explanation for why he is not to be identified, at least completely, with it. 
That is, Agamemnon could be saying: I am not to be identified with the taking of 
Briseis because I was quite literally not in my right mind. If we take this to be the 
case, however, we cannot also accept that Agamemnon fully accepted responsibility 
for his wrongdoing.
On Konstan’s interpretation, however, the reason that Achilles’ renunciation of his 
resentment fails to qualify as forgiveness is not because Agamemnon did not offer 
a satisfactory apology but rather, because “a more powerful emotion — his grief at 
the loss of Patroclus — has driven out his resentment” (2010:61). This argument has 
strong textual support, as evidenced by the following speech of Achilles’, uttered upon 
learning of Patroclus’ death:10
[W]hy, I wish that strife would vanish away from among gods and mortals, / and gall, 
which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind, / that gall of anger that swarms 
like smoke inside of a man’s heart / and becomes a thing sweeter to him by far than 
the dripping of honey. / So it was here that the lord of men Agamemnon angered me. / 
Still, we will let this all be a thing of the past, and for all our / sorrow beat down by 
force the anger deeply within us. (Il. 18.107–113)
However, while Konstan might be right that it is grief that drives out Achilles’ 
resentment, is he right that the moderation of resentment by emotions such as grief 
cannot qualify as forgiveness? Konstan does not defend or elaborate on his claim 
here, but he can be seen to be following Griswold in the following way. Griswold, 
like most contemporary commentators on forgiveness, thinks that not every way of 
overcoming resentment is going to qualify as forgiveness. For example, the victim 
who overcomes her resentment by forgetting the wrongdoing in question, or forcing it 
from her mind, cannot be said to have forgiven her offender. According to Griswold, 
it is only when resentment is moderated or overcome by reasons, specifically moral 
reasons, that forgiveness can be said to have occurred.11 He gives the following as 
9 This is a question much-debated in classical scholarship that cannot be properly addressed here.
10 It also has the support of the scholia. Konstan quotes the scholiast [bT] ad Il. 18.122–13 thus: “Of the 
two emotions besetting Achilles’ soul, anger [orgē] and grief [lupē], one wins out. ... For the emotion 
involving Patroclus is strongest of all, and so it is necessary to abandon his wrath [mēnis] and to avenge 
himself on his enemies” (ibid., 25 n. 25).
11 Contemporary scholars such as Pamela Hieronymi agree with Griswold that reason must do the 
work of moderating resentment, but do not follow Griswold in limiting reason to “moral reasons” 
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an explanation of what he means by moral reasons “it [being] the right or virtuous 
thing to do” (2007a:54). We see Konstan appealing to such a moral reason when he 
claims that the time for forgiveness was back in Iliad 9, and that by the time of Iliad 
18 the question of forgiveness has become “moot” (2010:61). The reason that Konstan 
offers for this is that in Iliad 9, Agamemnon had, via his embassies, offered Achilles 
compensation in the form of gifts and the hand of one of his daughters in marriage 
(2010:60). As Agamemnon had originally wronged Achilles by publicly calling into 
question his heroic virtue and preeminence among the Achaeans, Agamemnon’s offer 
of compensation could be seen to be a moral reason for Achilles to forgive, insofar as 
it affirms Achilles’ heroic virtue. What we do not see, then, in Achilles’ renunciation 
of his resentment at Agamemnon is Griswoldian forgiveness. What we might see, 
however, is perhaps the earliest articulation in Western thought of one of Griswold’s 
conditions: the offender’s narrative account of her wrongdoing.
More importantly, in this speech we see the most poignant expression of the depth 
of Achilles’ wrath at Agamemnon which, though overcome now by his more intense 
sorrow, still burns dully within him. But it is the “incomparable” expression of the 
ubiquitous human struggle to forgive in this passage that Griswold finds most striking 
(2007a:xiii). Indeed, it is with this speech of Achilles that Griswold chooses to open 
his monograph, preceding it with the words:
Who among us has not longed to be forgiven? Nearly everyone has suffered the bit-
ter injustice of wrongdoing. Who has not struggled to forgive? Revenge impulsively 
surges in response to wrong, and becomes perversely delicious to those possessed 
by it. ... Homer’s Achilles captured the agony of our predicament incomparably well. 
(2007a:xiii)
How can Griswold, whose own account of forgiveness precludes the possibility 
that Achilles’ renunciation of his resentment is a manifestation of forgiveness, cite 
this as capturing the struggle to forgive?
Griswold clearly sees this passage as illuminative of the contemporary forgiveness 
discourse. I want to suggest that one way in which this passage is illuminating is that it 
is one of the earliest depictions available to us of the vice of unforgivingness. Consider 
Griswold’s sketch of the hard-hearted, unforgiving person:
We justly blame a person who is unable to forgive, when forgiveness is warranted, and 
judge that person as hard-hearted. The person who finds all wrong unforgivable seems 
imprisoned by the past, unable to grow, confined by the harsh bonds of resentment. 
He or she might also strike us as rather too proud, even arrogant, and as frozen in the 
uncompromising attitude. (2007a:xiv)
(2001). Scholars such as Luke Russell (2016) and Lucy Allais (2008), however, oppose Griswold in this, 
arguing that the work of moderating resentment is not exclusive to reasons, but that the moderation 
of resentment by other emotions, such as grief, might also qualify as forgiveness (2016). It is there-
fore a possibility, from the perspective of some modern conceptions of interpersonal forgiveness, for 
Achilles’ renunciation of his resentment towards Agamemnon, insofar as it is replaced by grief, to 
count as forgiveness.
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This could very well be a character portrait of Achilles himself. Of all the Homeric 
characters to look to for the virtue of forgivingness, Achilles is — at least for most 
of the Iliad — one of the worst. While Achilles undoubtedly has good reasons for 
resenting Agamemnon, as the Iliad progresses and the tide of war turns in favour 
of the Trojans, new reasons come into play and one might suggest, as many Iliadic 
characters do, that Achilles is blameworthy for not being responsive to them. Such 
criticisms of Achilles in the Iliad focus on his hard-heartedness, pride, arrogance and 
pitilessness. For example, in Iliad 24 Apollo criticises Achilles’ mind for lacking the 
quality of pliability (oute noēma gnampton, 40–41), that is, for having a blameworthy 
hardness to it and for the arrogance of his thumos (agēnori thumōi, 42).12 This rebuke is 
prompted by Achilles’ persistence in wreaking revenge on Hector for slaughtering his 
beloved Patroclus for nine days after Hector has actually died. In it we hear an echo of 
Hector’s dying words, in which he also condemns Achilles’ psychological state, accus-
ing him of having a heart of iron in his chest (sidēreos en phresi thumos, 22.357). 
Achilles has just refused to fulfill Hector’s dying wish of returning his corpse to his 
mother and father for the proper burial rites that would enable him to be to be received 
into the afterlife. He threatens the dying Hector, saying that he wished he could hack 
his flesh away and eat it raw (22.346–348), and taunts him with the knowledge that his 
corpse will soon be nothing more than carrion for wild beasts of prey (22.345–354). 
And, again, in the embassy of Iliad 9 it is Achilles’ heart that is the focus of Phoenix’s 
rebuke: “Then, Achilleus, beat down your great anger. / It is not yours to have a piti-
less heart [nēlees ētor]. The very immortals / can be moved [streptoi]; their virtue and 
honour and strength are greater than ours are, / and yet with libations and with savour 
men turn back even the immortals / in supplication, when any man does wrong and 
transgresses” (9.496–501). Achilles’ refusal to be moved by Agamemnon’s offer of 
compensation is, Phoenix argues, impious in its pridefulness. Why should Achilles 
have such a pitiless heart, if even the gods can be moved to pardon those who have 
offended them?
In the first Iliadic example considered by Konstan, then, we do not find inter-
personal forgiveness according to Griswold. However, what we do find in Achilles’ 
refusal to renounce his resentment at Agamemnon throughout most of the Iliad, is 
a depiction of the vice of unforgivingness. The existence of the vice of unforgiving-
ness suggests the existence of its opposite, forgivingness; otherwise according to 
which criteria is Achilles thought to be morally blameworthy by Apollo and Phoenix? 
What we find in Konstan’s second Iliadic example, I will suggest, is an Achilles who 
has progressed slightly along the virtue spectrum from unforgivingness towards 
forgivingness.
12 Apollo’s rebuke is found in the following speech to the gods: “No, you gods; your desire is to help this 
cursed Achilleus / within whose breast there are no feelings of justice, nor can / his mind be bent [oute 
noēma gnampton], but his purposes are fierce, like a lion / who when he has given way to his own great 
strength and his haughty / spirit [agēnori thumōi], goes among the flocks of men, to devour them” (Il. 
24.39–43).
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The second Iliadic scene discussed by Konstan is that between Achilles and Priam 
in Iliad 24. The gods have sent Priam to Achilles’ tent to beseech him to cease his 
maltreatment of Hector’s corpse and return it to the Trojans to be buried:
Tall Priam / came in unseen by the other men and stood close beside him / and caught 
the knees of Achilleus in his arms, and kissed the hands / that were dangerous and 
manslaughtering and had killed so many of his sons. ... /... Priam spoke to him in the 
words of a suppliant: / ‘Achilleus like the gods, remember your father, one who / is 
of years like mine, and on the door-sill of sorrowful old age. / And they who dwell 
nearby encompass him and afflict him, / nor is there any to defend him against the 
wrath, the destruction’. (24.476–489)
This act of supplication recalls to mind the last person to attempt to supplicate 
Achilles, the dying Hector, as well as the savagery of Achilles’ response to him. We 
are therefore suitably shocked when Achilles responds to Priam’s supplication not 
with anger, but by taking Priam’s hand and raising him from his humble position at 
Achilles’ feet:
[Achilleus] rose from his chair, and took the old man by the hand, and set him / on 
his feet again, in pity for the grey head and the grey beard, / and spoke to him and 
addressed him in winged words: ‘Ah, unlucky, / surely you have had much evil to 
endure in your spirit’. (Il. 24.515–518)
Achilles not only agrees to Priam’s request but invites the old man to partake of 
a meal with him in order to discuss how long Priam would like a cessation of hostili-
ties so that Hector may receive the proper burial rites.
This instance of Achilles’ renunciation of his resentment is even less likely to fulfill 
Griswold’s forgiveness conditions than the previous example. Achilles surely does not 
foreswear revenge completely, proceeding to fight against the Trojans after the end of 
the temporary truce. Nor does Achilles wholly succeed in moderating his resentment 
against Priam, let alone commit to fully relinquishing it. Achilles’ control of his anger 
is tenuous at best: he responds to Priam’s reference to compensation with anger, warn-
ing Priam not to provoke him (24.559–570); he earns himself a comparison to a lion as 
he bounds off to tend to Hector’s corpse (24.572); and he takes pains not to let Priam 
see the corpse before it has been washed and anointed, lest Priam’s grief brim over 
and Achilles’ rage follow suit, resulting in Achilles taking Priam’s life (24.582–586). 
However, recalling Griswold’s contention that the virtue of forgivingness is associated 
with the virtues of self-command, understanding and trust, here we see Achilles show 
an uncharacteristic degree of self-command. Moreover, it is not even clear how to 
structure this scene along the lines of a traditional forgiveness interaction. Achilles is 
clearly in the wrong having spent the previous nine days trailing the corpse of Priam’s 
son around the city behind his chariot, but it is Priam who humbles himself before 
Achilles here. Could Priam be the wrongdoer from Achilles’ perspective insofar as 
he fathered the man who killed Achilles’ beloved?
It is perhaps strange, then, that Konstan would choose to examine a scene so 
unlikely to qualify as Griswoldian forgiveness. However, just as Griswold thinks that 
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Achilles’ renunciation of his anger at Agamemnon illuminates contemporary forgive-
ness discourse, so too does he think this interaction between Achilles and Priam is 
worth contemplating. Specifically, Griswold thinks this scene is worth contemplating 
insofar as it acts as a “touchstone” for the elements of shared humanity, pity, sympathy 
requisite for forgiveness (2007a:xxii); indeed, Griswold returns to this interaction 
frequently throughout Forgiveness. As noted above, it is the sympathetic identifica-
tion of the victim with the offender that is at the heart of the victim’s transformation 
in the dyadic relationship of forgiveness. Griswold contends:
The encounter between Achilles and Priam is one of the most compelling depictions in 
all of Western literature of the recognition of shared humanity. ... There is no question 
of forgiveness or reconciliation, no talk about who is right or wrong, no talk about 
injury or justice. Yet they do recognize each other’s humanity. First, each is reminded 
by the other of loved ones; Priam puts Achilles in mind of his own father, and he weeps 
for him; Achilles reminds Priam of Hector, and he too grieves. They participate in 
analogous webs of human attachment and recognize that as the case: just as you are a 
father, so I have a father; as I am a father, you have a father; just as I am a son, so you 
have a son. We may not care for each other, but we each care for our kin, and know 
what care is. There are analogous ties of concern, of misery, of rootedness in and love 
of one’s homeland. (2007a:77)
In this encounter, we see Griswold’s reframing condition poignantly realised, 
each character ceasing to identify the other exclusively with his wrongdoing. Priam 
ceases to identify Achilles exclusively with the murderer of his son and mutilator of 
his corpse to such an extent that he is able to share a meal with him and marvel at the 
hero’s stature and beauty (24.629–630).
Achilles too succeeds in reframing Priam, ceasing to see Priam as his enemy, as the 
father of the man who slaughtered his beloved Patroclus, and coming to see him as 
someone worth listening to (24.633).13 More importantly, Achilles is able to see that 
he and Priam are fellow human beings, united in their sorrow and their vulnerability 
to the whims of the gods.14 This is a starkly different Achilles from the hard-hearted, 
proud, arrogant and pitiless Achilles we encountered earlier. What differentiates this 
Achilles from the earlier one is his experience of suffering, not merely his own suf-
fering from the loss of his beloved Patroclus, but his participation in the suffering of 
others, such as his father. Again we find ourselves facing the question of whether 
13 “But when they had put aside their desire for eating and drinking, / Priam, son of Dardanos, gazed 
upon Achilleus, wondering / at his size and beauty, for he seemed like an outright vision / of gods. 
Achilleus in turn gazed on Dardanian Priam / and wondered, as he saw his brave looks and listened to 
him talking” (24.628–632).
14 Achilles responds to Priam’s grief with the words: “Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate 
mortals, / that we live in unhappiness, but the gods themselves have no sorrows. / There are two urns 
that stand on the door-sill of Zeus. They are unlike / for the gifts they bestow: an urn of evils, an urn 
of blessings. / If Zeus who delights in thunder mingles these and bestows them / on man, he shifts, and 
moves now in evil, again in good fortune. / But when Zeus bestows from the urn of sorrows, he makes 
a failure / of man ...” (24.525–531).
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emotions such as grief can do the work of moderating resentment. It is through his 
suffering that Achilles is able to feel sympathy for Priam. In Iliad 24, we see an Achilles 
who, far from being trapped in the solipsism of pride and arrogance, is able both to 
participate in the suffering of others and see things from the perspective of others, 
showing understanding, another of the virtues Griswold associates with forgiving-
ness. Recall that in Priam’s first words to Achilles he entreated him to remember his 
father, adding that the two men stand on the door-sill of old age together (24.486–
487). Hearing these words, Achilles weeps alongside Priam. Through his grief at his 
father’s frailty and defencelessness, Achilles is able to move beyond his own sorrow, 
and participate in that of another father: Priam. He is, moreover, able to see himself 
through Priam’s eyes, as having been the cause of immense grief to Priam and his 
family (24.541–551), a point also made by Griswold (2007a:78). While Achilles is cer-
tainly no exemplar of the virtue of forgivingness, we can see from his encounter with 
Priam that he is no longer characterised so much by unforgivingness as he once was.
It is clear that Konstan is right to conclude that neither of the Iliadic encoun-
ters qualifies as paradigmatic examples of interpersonal forgiveness as conceived by 
Griswold. That said, it is hard to think of many examples that Griswold would accept 
as manifesting perfect forgiveness. In this paper, I have shown that even when we 
limit our discussion to Griswold’s account of forgiveness, there is more room for 
interpersonal forgiveness in the Iliad than Konstan would have us believe. Indeed, 
even though Griswold argues that interpersonal forgiveness was not valued by the 
classical Greek philosophers, he is reluctant to claim that they lacked the concept of 
it. Griswold expresses his reluctance thus:
Ancient pagan notions of forgiveness are a vast and poorly studied topic. That such 
notions existed is more than merely probable. The vocabulary for them was in place, 
along with a cluster of related notions — pardon, mercy, pity, compassion, apology, debt, 
relief, excuse, among others — as was a sophisticated understanding of the emotions 
(in particular, retributive anger) to which forgiveness somehow responds. (2007a:1)15
I join Griswold and urge scholars to resist accepting Konstan’s denial of forgive-
ness, Griswoldian or otherwise, in archaic Greece. Since Griswold’s monograph, there 
has been a welcome flourishing of scholarship on interpersonal forgiveness in various 
ancient societies, although we are yet to see one on archaic Greece.16 That such a study 
is necessary can be seen even from the brief discussion of it here.
15 Griswold continues: “Similarly, the ends that forgiveness proposes, such as reconciliation, peace, and 
certainly the forswearing of revenge, were well understood. I very much doubt that there existed a single 
view on any of these topics (something like ‘the ancient pagan view’), though establishing that point would 
require a careful and comprehensive study of ancient literature, law court speeches and jurisprudence, 
the writings of the historians and physicians, and of course the philosophical texts. As is true in respect 
of other ideas, it would not surprise if the philosophers rejected or modified common views about 
forgiveness and related notions. Nonetheless, such notions did circulate in pre-Christian pagan thought 
and culture (counting here the Roman as well as the Greek), contrary to common wisdom” (2007a:1).
16 For example, see: Harbsmeier (2011) on ancient China; Dover (1991) on ancient Greece; Krašovec 
(1999) on ancient Israel; Ramelli (2011) on early Christianity; and Romilly (1995) on Greek tragedy.
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